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Wendy Sigle-Rushton and Elin Lindström 
1. Introduction 
Intersectionality is a key concept in gender studies both because feminist scholars 
played a key role in its early development  and because, once articulated, it has provided 
an enormously challenging critique with extensive theoretical and political implications.  
It is a concept with a rich and diverse geneaology, one in which gender studies figures 
prominently, not least because intersectionalitionality can been seen as  a logical 
extension of critical feminist approaches.   
An important early contribution of feminist scholarship was its critique of mainstream 
research for not acknowledging or incorporating the experiences of women. Feminists 
developed tools to uncover strategies of power and exclusion that were hidden in 
mainstream, male dominated and male centred research. In an attempt to understand 
what it means to be oppressed “as a woman”, some feminist scholars sought to isolate 
gender oppression from other forms of oppression, and as a direct consequence, their 
work tended to be either pre-occupied with the experiences of white middle class 
women or to ignore completely the experiences of other women. It is from critiques of 
this (largely feminist) work, that the development and articulation of intersectionality 
began to take shape.  However, it wasn't until just over two decades ago that the 
theoretical concept found its name. 
 
The  term intersectionality was coined by Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989) in her seminal 
critique of US antidiscrimination law and its failure to acknowledge Black women’s 
unique experiences of racism and sexism as simultaneous and inseparable.   As 
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Crenshaw argued,  if there is no unified group of women that experience gender 
discrimination in the same way,  it makes no sense to treat sexism and racism as if they 
could be isolated, and then understood and redressed separately.  Legislation that 
proceeds in this way fails to provide equal protection to black women.   While the 
concept did not represent a new way of thinking, its articulation gave voice to long-
standing and widespread  theoretical preoccupations and provided a much-needed 
frame of reference for the comparison and negotiation of various endeavours, opening 
up space for critical dialogue.   
 
Described as "…one the most important theoretical contributions that Women's Studies, 
in conjunction with related fields, has made thus far" (McCall, 2005, pg. 1771), it did not 
take long for intersectionality to enter the  feminist lexicon.    Despite, or perhaps 
because of, its continued pervasiveness, intersectionality is understood in a wide variety 
of ways, as both a theoretical and an analytic tool.  Nonetheless, relative to its theoretical 
sophistication, its methodology remains poorly specified and underdeveloped (McCall 
2005; Nash 2008).  With these two points in mind, rather than attempt to catalogue the 
myriad ways in which the concept can be formulated (both explicitly and implicitly), 
which would extend well beyond our limits of size and scope, we have chosen a more 
modest but more tractable strategy for our contribution.   In what follows, we briefly 
present intersectionality's main theoretical premise and trace out its implications.1 We 
pay particular attention to what the implications mean for how we analyse gender and 
gender inequalities.   In recent years, researchers have expressed concern that "there 
                                                        
1 We acknowledge that space limitations mean our treatment of the underlying theoretical 
premise  is both cursory and incomplete, and does not acknowledge the discussions and debates 
that surround its meaning and interpretation.  However,  we are more concerned with the 
implications, the substance of which would remain generally unmodified were we to examine 
the core theoretical premise in more depth and detail.   
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has been little discussion of how to study intersectionality, that is, of its methodology." 
(McCall, 2005, pg 1771; see also Nash 2008).  By illustrating some of the issues that 
must be grappled with when we seek to use intersectionality to rethink how we go 
about analysis, we aim to contribute to the development of this discussion.  
2. Intersectionality: Theoretical Premise and Critique 
Intersectionality  is, by all accounts, a  loosely specified theoretical concept   -- an 
umbrella term  -- that brings  together a set of ideas about the complex 
multidimensionality of subjectivity and social stratification and the consequences of its 
mis-specification.   At its root, intersectionality posits that different dimensions of social 
life (hierarchies, axes of differentiation, axes of oppression, social structures, 
normativities) are  intersecting, mutally modifying and inseparable.   They “fuse to 
create unique experiences and opportunities for all groups” (Brown and Misra, 2003, pg. 
488).  If we accept this basic premise, the implications are both extensive and profound.  
First,  any  (unqualified and unreflective) references to   "woman" as a stand alone 
category are deemed problematic.   We cannot "think of a woman’s “womanness” in 
abstraction from the fact that she is a particular woman, whether she is a middle-class 
Black woman living in North America in the twentieth century or a poor white woman 
living in France in the seventeenth century” (Spelman 1988, pg. 13).  Second, because 
multidimensionality cannot be understood or assessed as a series of additive and 
separable relationships, we cannot understand Black women's experiences of 
discrimination by thinking separately about sex discrimination and race discrimination.  
Additive thinking of this sort, assumes away, for example, the possibility that Black 
women experience different kinds of gender oppression than white women or different 
kinds of racial  oppression than Black  men. 
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Taken together these two corollaries require that we  take on and take in an enormous 
amount of complexity.  Instead of a vector of social structures, each of which can be 
assessed in its own right, we are confronted with a "matrix of domination"  in which 
each cell represents a unique position (Collins 2000).  But if we sacrifice complexity, we 
also sacrifice inclusion.   Failing to account adequately for complexity means that the 
experiences of the multiply marginalised are likely to be overlooked or obscured, 
bringing issues of power and privilege within feminist theory and politics into stark 
relief. For example, consider the claim, common in Anglo-American feminisms during 
the 1970s,  that gender inequality is rooted in women’s exclusion from the public sphere 
of work and politics and that to redress gender inequality, feminism should promote 
women’s entry into the public sphere by facilitating (or at least removing obstacles to) 
their labour market participation.  This account tended to universalize the experiences 
of certain women, most of whom were white, middle or upper-class women in 
heterosexual marriages. It was not necessarily relevant to all women, as Patricia Hill 
Collin’s (2000, pg. 45-67) overview of studies of Black women’s experiences in the 
United States demonstrates. Rather than being confined to ‘the private’, there is a long 
history of Black women’s paid  or bonded work in the US ‘public’. But instead of being a 
route to empowerment, it was, and for many remains, a site of hard work for low pay, 
often in the low-status service sector. In addition, rather than ‘the private’ home being a 
source of subordination, it has been described as a site of respite from and resistance to 
the discrimination experienced in public (ibid., pg. 46).     
Accepting the basic premise of intersectionality means acknowledging that power 
hierarchies not only stratify two supposedly homogenous groups -- ‘women’ and ‘men’ -- 
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but that power hierarchies are also involved in determining whose experiences count 
and who gets to speak on behalf of ‘women’ (Spelman 1988, pg. 77-79).     It not only 
calls to mind analyses focusing on power, both in relation to sexuality and in relation to 
racialisation, that document the ways in which the essentialising assumptions and 
perspectives of privileged women permeate much of feminist discourse.   These 
concerns also resonate with postmodern and postructuralist arguments that the act of 
categorization itself is part of the workings of power, producing, policing and stratifying 
subjects.     
Because it provides a powerful and salutory critique of how feminism has conducted 
itself, intersectionality raises some troubling questions.  If  we cannot somehow 
conceptualise or name women as a group,  does feminist politics become meaningless?  
This leads to a commonly identified dilemma: “… how simultaneously to hold on to a 
radical and contingent account of knowledge claims and knowing subjects, thereby 
dissolving the false “we” of the feminist standpoint, while maintaining solidarity, across 
differences, among women in the name of a long-term or wide-ranging feminist 
movement.” (Dietz 2003, pg. 410) 
 3.  Intersectional Analysis 
Thus far, we have discussed how intersectionality has provided a critical tool that was 
used to uncover important weaknesses in how we have gone about trying to understand 
and analyse gender.   In this section, we consider how, taking the implications of 
intersectionalinty into account, we might modify the ways we analyse gender and 
gender inequality.   
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Broadly speaking, intersectionality requires that we sacrifice simplifying assumptions 
and embrace a good deal more complexity, while at the same time paying close attention 
to issues of power.     At present, there is no clear or straightforward solution for how 
that complexity can effectively be managed (McCall 2005). Clearly, an intersectional 
analysis should aim to treat different social dimensions as mutually modifying or 
reinforcing, but that is difficult, if not impossible, to accomplish in its entirety.   If the 
theoretical premise is taken to its limit, "this strategy can generate an infinite regress 
that dissolves groups into individuals" (Young, 1994, pg. 721).     Collins (1999) suggests 
that researchers should focus on “a concrete topic that is already the subject of 
investigation and … find the combined effects of race, class, gender, sexuality, and 
nation, where before only one or two interpretive categories were used.” (pg, 278).  
Even if we follow that pragmatic strategy and try to consider a limited but greater 
number of dimensions (and building on the findings of previous analytical endeavours), 
analysing all of the permutations of even three or four categories can be daunting.  It 
may dissolve into “just a listing of people and a description without any analysis as to 
how their particular conditions are located within structures of power.” (Crenshaw 
quoted in Guidroz & Berger 2009, 70).    
To both deal with complexity and allow a greater balance between description and 
analysis,  one strategy is to narrow the analysis to a particular set of intersections and 
focus intensively on marginalised or neglected groups located at the interstices of 
several social dimensions (McCall 2005). Comparisons with analyses that treat as 
homogeneous the more broadly defined category to which that group belongs provides 
opportunities  to explore the diverse experiences of differentially located subjects.   
Nonetheless, to the extent that this approach is only the first stage of a larger project – 
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one which seeks to redress previous oversights and the impact of previous exclusions on 
theory and practice  – it is a strategy that defers rather than obviates questions about 
how to deal with complexity.  Methods for dealing with complexity, including how to 
present it (a particularly vexing issue when faced with the constraints and space and 
scope imposed by some scholarly outlets like journals), remain limited and 
underdeveloped (Mc Call 2005).  
Both the broader and the more narrow approaches  to analysis that we have just 
described begin with the use of analytic categories.  They both draw attention to the 
importance of heterogeneity within broadly defined analytic categories.   But 
intersectionality highlights dilemmas that may lead us to ask whether (or at least when)  
it possible to justifiy the use of categories in this way (McCall 2005).  If categories will 
never sufficiently capture complexity and if  the act of categorisation is an exercise of 
power that disciplines and manages difference (Dietz 2003, 411-414),  any approach 
which uses categories must proceed with great care.  The choice of categories matters 
for how inequality comes to be understood, shapes whose situation is highlighted and 
obscured, and produces specific subject positions.  Although methodological approaches 
which aim to deconstruct categories and those which provisionally and pragmatically 
make use of them might be understood as mutually exclusive and incompatible, we 
think this interpretation should be resisted.   Intersectional analyses should aim both to  
document patterns of inequality and to explore how groups and categories are produced 
– and here we see the potential for intersectionality to build bridges across the material-




4.   Concluding Thoughts 
In the past two decades, intersectionality has transformed the way we think about 
feminist theory and politics. Intersectionality illustrates the need for feminist scholars to 
pay greater attention to issues of inclusion, privilege and power.   By drawing attention 
to processes of exclusion and its consequences,  intersectionality  highlights the need to 
critically question our own position and assumptions.  It provides a salutory reminder 
that the conceptual models we employ determine not just what we ask but also what we 
are able to find, that our definition and use of categories, our underlying assumptions, 
and our modes of analysis all work to focus attention to some areas and divert it from 
others.  Because  intersectionality provides a set of critical questions and challenges that 
cannot be resolved, but must be made part of reflective approaches to feminist theory 
and practice, we expect it will remain both prominent and influential for years to come.  
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